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Software piracy is a global problem that costs businesses billions of dollars each year. This study presents the first time series 
analysis looking at what influences software piracy. It includes data for 85 countries associating economic, cultural, and 
temporal variables with national software piracy rates. Some of the variables included coincide with those in previous studies 
(GDP, collectivism and power indexes) while others are new to this study (time, high tech exports, IT expenditures). The 
results show that the aforementioned variables are significantly associated with software piracy rates and that more specific 
influences can be investigated by looking at breakpoints in GDP. This knowledge is important to several areas both within 
and outside academia such as future policy formation aimed at curbing software piracy, the creation of preventive and 
deterrent controls for software piracy, and future research of the phenomenon discussed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Illegal copying and use (piracy) of copyrighted material (movies, music, business and entertainment software, books) 
constitutes a considerable proportion of the total lost revenue due to intellectual property violations. According to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIO) (Idris, 2003), the impacts of product counterfeiting (illegally making copies of 
patented items) and piracy (illegal copying and/or use of copyrighted material) amount to between 5% and 7% of world trade, 
representing € 200 to 300 billion a year in lost revenue, and the loss of 200,000 jobs worldwide. For the US alone, the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA, 2003) estimates that piracy losses in copyrighted materials in 2002 totaled 
10.8 billion USD, with the piracy of software amounting to about 60% of the total, or approximately 6.5 billion USD. 
Software producers have attempted to restrain this drain of lost revenue through technological and legal means to little avail. 
The proportion of pirated software worldwide has remained in excess of 40% over the past decade, according to the Business 
Software Alliance (BSA, 2003). The reasons for this persistence are that software piracy is a complex phenomenon, making 
the means for effective control far from clear. Clearly, the phenomenon of software piracy is too complex to be curtailed by 
simple and direct technological and legal means. Doing so effectively and to a meaningful extent is likely to require a 
complex combination of legislation, treaty, cooperation, and education, as well as, undoubtedly, enforcement and 
impediment. The first step toward that end is the understanding of what could be called the ecology of the problem—the 
fundamental environmental conditions in which it flourishes. 
We endeavor in this study to develop clear and sound representations of the factors influencing software piracy in search of 
that understanding, and in the hope that—even in a small way—it helps to inform and guide the development of policies and 
agreements which will appropriately balance the rights of holders with the needs and preferences of users. This study intends 
to discover prominent economic, social, and temporal variables associated with the phenomenon of software piracy using 
country level data for 85 countries over a ten-year period. This is an important difference from previous studies that utilized 
cross sectional data for single time periods only. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Many authors have researched the influences of software piracy rates see (Gopal and Sanders, 1998; Gopal and Sanders, 
2000; Husted, 2000; Marron and Steel, 2000; Shin, Gopal, Sanders and Whinston, 2004). Each of these studies looks at how 
economic variables influence software piracy. Shin et al. (2004) and Gopal and Sanders (1998) both use GDP per capita as a 
measure of income. In addition Marron and Steel (2000) looked at how R&D influenced software piracy rates. Each of these 
studies looked at cross-sectional country level data with a maximum of 77 countries included in the study. 
Studies also looked at how cultural and economic variables together influenced software piracy rates. Marron and Steel 
(2000), Husted (2000), and Shin et al. (2004) have all used the collectivism index with significant results, while Husted also 
included the power index in his study. These were also cross-sectional country level studies that used software piracy rates as 
the dependent variable. A study by Ronkainen and Guerreo-Cosumano (2001) that investigated the influences on intellectual 
property violations also found individualism (the mirror index of collectivism) to explain a significant portion of the variance 
in that study. This made it clear that any future study would need to look at both types of variables in conjunction with each 
other. Table 1 summarizes the findings of previous research projects, including both empirical and conceptual studies.  
Although quite a few antecedents of software piracy have been studied, no study has comprehensively examined them at a 
country level. This study hypothesizes that software piracy rates are influenced by economic, cultural, and temporal factors. 
In addition, a cross-sectional time series database was used to test these hypotheses. This study offers a unique contribution 
to the software piracy area in that it presents the dynamics of software piracy based on time series analysis with the most 
complete set of countries compiled so far. Both the economic indicators and the software piracy rates are measured over 
multiple time periods. This means that if software piracy rates have temporal variation static (single-period) estimates would 
be biased.  
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection describes the variables and data that were used 
in the analysis portion of this study. The second subsection describes how the data were analyzed. 
Variables and Data Description 
This study empirically investigates factors influencing national software piracy rates. Country level data for 86 countries 
were collected for the period 1991-2001 from the annual business software alliance global software piracy study, the World 
Bank database, and Hoefstede’s cultural variables data. The data were analyzed in order to determine which variables are 
associated with software piracy rates at the country level. 
The dependent variable for this study is national software piracy rates. The independent variables used fall into three 
categories: economic variables, cultural variables, and temporal variables. In total six independent variables were used across 
the three categories. The following paragraphs will describe the source and meaning of each variable.  
The national software piracy rate was collected from the BSA global software piracy study. This variable represents the 
percentage of pirated software installed out of total software installed. Roughly this is calculated as the difference between 
total software installed (demand) and total legal software shipped (supply). 
In order to determine the economic variables to include in this study we turned to both theoretical and empirical justification. 
Such a great number of economic variables are available to study from the World Bank database that a refined set needed to 
be determined for use in this study. Quite a few studies provide us with variables that have significant impact on software 
piracy. As most country-level studies have developed a base model with economic variables, we test the effects of gross 
domestic product and information technology expenditures. In addition, we also consider cultural and temporal variables that 
have been examined with the phenomenon of software piracy based on the previous studies. In order to accomplish this 
process factor analysis was used to identify a reduced set of variables. This was necessary in order to minimize redundancy 
(remove multicollinearity) among the variables. Multicollinearity adversely affects regression coefficients and predictions in 
multiple regression (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim and Wasserman, 1996). The reduced set of variables was then entered into a 
forward stepwise regression (along with the cultural and temporal variables) that further removed some variables from the 
final model.  
The results produced the following set of three economic variables included in the study: gross domestic product (GDP), 
information technology expenditures, and high-tech exports from the World Bank database (2002). GDP is gross domestic 
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same 
purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States, and these controls for the difference of purchasing  
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Study Level Sample 
Size 
DV IVs Key Findings 
Burton,Raghu,Sin
ha,&Vinze (2003) 




Preliminary findings from an experimental design that 
supports previous findings that preventive controls such 
as encryption may hurt profits. 
Cheng,Sims,&Tee
gen (1997) 





reservation price  
Describe a decision-making scheme to determine when 
people buy vs. pirate software. Individuals will pirate 
when the cost of pirating is lower than the price of buying 
and the individuals reservation price. 
Gopal&Sanders 
(1997) 






Creates a model to test the effects of anti-piracy measures 
on publisher profits. Results suggest that preventive 
controls have an inverse impact on profits and deterrent 
controls may have a positive impact on profits. 









Provides support for the proposition that a government’s 
incentive to enact and enforce copyright protection laws 
is closely related to the size of the domestic software 
industry. Also presents a model for ethical intentions 
based on ethical predisposition and demographics. 
Gopal&Sanders 
(2000) 
Country 65 SPR GNP An inverse relationship between software piracy rates and 
per capita GNP with a break at $6,000 with those below 
the break being affected more. 






Included cultural variables finding that GNP per capita, 
income inequality, and individualism are significantly 
related to software piracy (all relationships are inverse). 
Marron&Steel 
(2000) 
Country 77 SPR Income, R&D 
Individualism, 
Education. 
The inverse relationships of individualism, per capita 
income and strength of economic institutions explain the 








All variables have an inverse relationship with IPV 
(intellectual property violation). Also classified 
determinants of intellectual property violation into two 




Country 49 SPR GDP, 
Collectivism 
Found that there is a break at $6,000 (similar to above 
study) and collectivism explains a good portion of the 
variance in software piracy rates. 
Swinyard,Rinne,&
Kau (1990) 





Presents a cross-cultural study of differences in morality 
and behavior between individuals in Singapore and the 
United States. Conclude that Asian attitudes towards 










Tested an ethical decision making model on entry level IS 
workers in the context of softlifting. Find support for the 
model and suggests that the decision to softlift is 
determined by ethical judgment. 
Wagner&Sanders 
(2001) 





Looks at the relationship between religion and a 
theoretical ethical decision making process. Results 
suggest there is a relationship between religion and the 
stages in the decision making process. 
Table 1 Summary of Empirical Findings From the Literature 
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power among countries. GDP was the most commonly included economic variable in previous studies. High tech exports are 
products with high research and development costs, such as aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, 
and electrical machinery. This is in line with a study by Marron and Steel (2000) that looked at how R&D influenced 
software piracy rates. Information and communications technology expenditures are one variable that include external 
spending on IT (so called tangible spending such as products purchased), internal spending on IT (intangible spending such 
as in house customization of software and capital depreciation), and spending on telecommunications equipment. 
The cultural variables included in this study were chosen based on results by previous researchers that have been shown to 
explain some portion of the variance in national software piracy rates. Marron and Steel (2000), Husted (2000), Shin et al. 
(2004) and Ronkainen et al. (2001) all found some cultural variable to be significant in their studies. From Hofstede’s 
seminal cultural study, we collected the indexes of the two cultural variables; the individualism-collectivism and the power 
index used in this study.  “The power index is a power distance, that is the extent to which members of a society accept that 
power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally. A society’s Power Distance norm is present in the values of 
both the leaders and the led, and reflected in the structure and functioning of the society’s institutions (Hofstede, 1983).” 
“Individualism collectivism index: individualism, which stands for a preference for a loosely knit social framework in which 
individuals are supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate families only; as opposed to Collectivism, which 
stands for a preference for a tightly knit social framework in which individuals are emotionally integrated into an extended 
family, clan, or other in-group which will protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. The word Collectivism in this 
sense carries no political connotations and does not assume any positions as to the role of the state; it operates at a much 
smaller scale of social integration (Hofstede, 1983).” 
Both the power index and collectivism index are variables that do not contain a time structure, which could potentially create 
issues in a time series analysis. Statistically the error structure of the two variables is cross-sectional while the error structure 
of our other variables varies over time and space. Theoretically (Merritt, 2000)has shown that Hofstede’s cultural indices are 
replicable across different time periods and subject groups. In particular collectivism showed to be durable across time and 
subjects. This provides the current study with the necessary empirical and theoretical foundations to continue using 
Hofstede’s cultural indices. 
The temporal variable is year, which is simply the year of the data for the individual country. The data spans ten years from 
1991 to 2001. Year was used to look for a time structure in the data. This variable is important for the following reasons: 
One, aggregate data tend to be serially correlated, because aggregate measures tend to change slowly (serial correlation due 
to “inertia/momentum”). Two, the existence of serial correlation induces estimation bias and violates the regression (OLS) 
assumption of independent observations (resulting in serially-correlated residuals). Finally, including a time index like year 
estimates the effects of “time” not accounted for by other independent variables, and thus corrects the bias and removes the 
serial correlation from the residuals (this is tested for confirmed later). In addition, the variable year is a trend coefficient that 
represents the average rate at which the measure of interest is changing independently of other influences.  The results of 
estimation may be caused by the fact that the world average software piracy rates are declining (in both high and low PPP 
countries) over the period observed. Preliminary analysis (factor analysis discussed above) indicated a substantial amount of 
redundancy among the original economic candidate variables so subsets of variables with less redundancy were chosen based 
on that analysis. The economic, cultural, and temporal variables included in the model are: gross domestic product (GDP), a 
collectivism index (CI), year (YR), IT expenditures (ITE), a power index (PI), and high tech exports (HTE). 
Analysis 
The data structure for this model (including cultural, economic, and temporal variables) is a “cross-sectional time-series,” 
which means that it includes observations over both space and time. Forward stepwise regression was used to create a model 
showing the significant set of variables chosen from all available data. In addition, two models based on GDP were found 
which investigate the differences between more and less developed countries. This was completed because previous studies 
found these breaks in GDP to help clarify differences in software piracy rates. For these two models a shift occurs at a GDP 
of $12,000, which differs from the previous studies conducted by Gopal and Sanders (2000) and Shin et al. (2004) that found 
GDP shifts at $6,000.  
RESULTS  
Table 2 present the results of the three regression analyses for this study. The estimation (i) includes all variables and gives 
overall macro level results for this study. Overall, the result shows that software piracy rates are significantly related to 
cultural, economic, and temporal factors. Specifically GDP, YR, ITE, and HTE are inversely related to software piracy rates. 
This indicates that as income raises software piracy rates decline; as time progresses software piracy rates are decreasing at 
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an average of 2.5% per year; and that increased spending in IT and high tech exports will have small impacts in lowering 
software piracy rates. YR indicates that there are temporal variations in software piracy rates, indicating that cross-sectional 
studies do not fully explain the phenomenon. The cultural variables collectivism and power are positively related to software 
piracy rates. This implies that in cultures that are highly collective software piracy rates are higher. This is also true for 
cultures where the people feel that power is distributed unequally between the organizations and institutions. 
The overall model explains 76% percent of the variance in software piracy rates between countries, is significant at the .001 
level (F (6, 209) = 113.49), has a standard error of the estimate of 8.784 and includes the following variables: GDP, CI, YR, 
ITE, PI, and HTE. It is worth noting that the correlation between YR and economic variables such as GDP, ITE, and HTE 
ranges between 0.10 and 0.15. 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Variable B Tolerance B Tolerance B Tolerance 
Intercept 5101.229 ***  5055.795 ***  4468.456 ***  
CI 0.2118 *** 0.385 0.199 *** 0.957 0.254 ***  
YR -2.53 *** 0.963 -2.498 *** 0.922 -2.217 ***  
ITE -0.004 *** 0.162 -0.089 *** 0.905 -0.006 *** 0.678 
HTE -0.00005 *** 0.650 0.00020 *** 0.975 -0.00006 *** 0.743 
GDP -0.417 *** 0.127     
PI 0.142 *** 0.347   0.124 *** 0.574 
Note: Significance at the .05, .01, and .001 levels are represented by *, **, and *** respectively. Model (ii) and (iii) include GDP shift. 
Table 2 Summary of Regression Results 
Analysis of Income Subsets 
Our result indicates that a country’s income level has a strong effect on the software piracy rates. Further we conducted an 
empirical estimation with an income breakpoint with those nations who’s GDP is above 12,000 and those where GDP is 
below 12,000. This breakpoint was empirically determined by looking at subsets of data where GDP was 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12, and 13 thousand respectively and choosing those with the highest correlations between piracy rates and GDP.  
We estimate our model without PI because PI turns out to be insignificant with the breakpoint (Column (ii) of Table 2). 
Overall, the model is significant at the .05 level (F (4,65) = 34.39), explains 66% of the variance in software piracy rates, and 
has a standard error of the estimate of 7.9120. Even though this model explains less variance than the overall model, we gain 
precision in the coefficient estimates and more valid specification (both overall standard error of estimates (SEE) are smaller 
as well as the standard error of the coefficients). This gives the ability to see more precisely how the variables influence 
software piracy rates at the given income level. GDP is not included because it is already taken into account when the data 
was grouped by GDP <> 12. 
The coefficient of ITE for countries with GDP less than $12,000 is ten times as influential on software piracy rates as it is at 
the overall or higher GDP levels. A possible explanation is that those few poorer countries that do spend significant money 
on IT products may try to protect those investments through stricter legislation in areas such as intellectual property as 
compared to poor countries that don’t spend much on IT. 
HTE for GDP less than 12 is five times more influential on software piracy rates than it is in the other models, and affects 
rates in the opposite direction. This could be because those countries have a less competitive software industry and poorer 
markets. It is also likely that at least a couple of those countries are also exporting pirated software. PI is not significant for 
poorer countries. This coincides with what Husted (2000) found in his study that power is not a significantly associated with 
software piracy rates. CI has roughly the same impact on poorer countries as it does for the overall results. 
The regression analysis of model (iii) explains 67 % of the variance in software piracy rates, is significant at the .05 level (F 
(5, 140) = 59.54), and has a standard error of the estimate of 7.8172. GDP is not included in this estimation because it is 
already taken into account when the data was grouped by the GDP breakpoint. HTE is statistically significant with countries 
of GDP over $12,000. It is probably because high-GDP countries have developed substantial volume of software industries, 
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and therefore actively try to protect their intellectual capital so that their software industry can continue to develop and profit 
from it. ITE are inversely related to software piracy rates with about the same impact as they had in the overall results. CI and 
YR have roughly the same influence on richer countries as they did on poorer countries and in the overall results. The PI also 
has about the same influence on richer countries as it did on the overall results. The intercept in the overall model implies that 
the software piracy rate would be 51% for values of the independent variables of zero. This is not a reasonable conclusion so 
it implies nonlinearity at lower levels of software piracy rates. An adequate linear fit is achieved because we are observing a 
limited range of values for piracy rates (no observations below .24). 
A tolerance score is considered with all three models to avoid a possible problem of multivariate interdependence of each 
variable. A tolerance score of zero indicates total dependence (redundancy) and a score of one indicates the variables are 
orthogonal. There are several variables in each model that are highly dependent: in the overall model GDP has a score of .13 
and ITE = .16; in the GDP < 12 model ITE = .17. The subset models have larger tolerance statistics suggesting that the 
relatively high interdependence of the variables largely rests with GDP. In addition, tests of residuals (Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
and first-order autocorrelation) indicate that the hypotheses of normality and independence of the residuals cannot be rejected 
at the .05 level for any of the three models. 
The data structure for this model is a cross-sectional time-series, meaning that it includes observations both over space and 
time. Thus, the error structure of the model (estimated by the residuals) may have separate and independent space and time 
components.  This is difficult to analyze, but may not be a problem. Analyses of the residuals do not indicate any patterns 
that would be present if there were persistent cross sectional effects not present in the other variables. Note that the residual 
(AND standard residual) has a 0.00 correlation with YR and all of the other regressors. Furthermore, the variable YR has 
high tolerances in all estimated models. Also, the standardized residuals and predictions are not correlated, as should be for 
an adequately specified model (independence between prediction and error). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARK 
By using a combination of economic and cultural variables over three quarters of the variance in piracy rates can be 
explained. The inclusion of times series is significant because ignoring the time-dependent nature of the data means that 
those influences will be either incorrectly accounted for by other dynamic factors such as population or GDP, or lumped into 
the residuals (in which case the residuals would not be independent). The results show that time (YR) is strongly and 
independently associated with software piracy rates, and that software rates decreased at an average rate of approximately 2 
percentage points over the time period represented. 
Cultural, economic and temporal factors all significantly influence software piracy rates. Collectivism has been found 
significant in several previous studies and shows that a country’s tendency to pirate software is based not only on the 
economic conditions within that country but also on how collective a society is. The more collective the greater the tendency 
to pirate software, since the greater good of the whole supercedes the rights of an individual. In the future it may be possible 
to create better deterrent controls by taking the collective nature of the society into account.  
This study again confirms the role that culture plays in software piracy. Replicating previous studies regarding ethical and 
moral judgment concerning consumer decision-making with the inclusion of cultural variables may provide clues as to how 
to help prevent piracy in the future. If these studies could perhaps be repeated or analyzed in the context of the culture they 
were conducted in it may provide clues as to how to help prevent piracy in the future. 
The inclusion of the power index as a significant variable differs from previous studies such as Husted (2000) that found 
power to not be a significant variable. This could be due to the cross sectional nature of Husted’s study or perhaps due to 
collinearity in Husted’s variables. Either way it adds some more depth to a complicated issue and presents a possible path for 
future research to explore the differences in more detail. 
While several economic variables have long been associated with software piracy studies, high tech exports are not found in 
any of the studies mentioned so far. They are found to affect countries differently according to their GDP, and thus, provide 
greater detail to a complicated issue. For countries with GDP less then 12 high tech exports are positively related to software 
piracy rates and are five times as influential. For wealthier nations high tech exports are inversely related but do not affect 
piracy rates a great deal. IT expenditures are also more influential for poorer countries, but is inversely related to both high 
and low GDPs. There is also room to explore the differences in GDP shifts found in this study vs. those found in Gopal and 
Sanders (2000). This study found a shift in GDP at $12,000, while Gopal and Sanders found the shift at $6,000. The time 
series nature of this study enabled it to more accurately capture the affects of income on national software piracy rates. 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to use time series data in the analysis of national software piracy rates. It is the 
authors’ hope that the results of this study offer a guideline to effective software piracy prevention treaties and legislation. As 
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our empirical results indicate, software piracy is a problem that is not going away. Because of this, it is important to learn all 
we can about what causes and influences national software piracy rates so that they can hopefully be controlled and possibly 
lowered in the future. For future work, it would be worthwhile to consider other factors explaining software piracy beyond 
this study.  
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